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The Tudeh Party of Iran and the Peasant Question, 1941-1953. 
 
Abstract  
This article will examine the Tudeh Party of Iran’s (TPI) attitude and agency towards the 
peasant question between its foundation in 1941 and the end of the party’s ability to operate in 
the domestic political scene in 1953.  Based on a close reading of party printed material and 
other relevant primary sources from those dozen years, the study will analyse the TPI’s attempt 
to formulate a coherent and practicable stance on the pressing issue of the amelioration of the 
peasant condition during the early stages of its formation and develop a lasting presence, with 
varying degrees of success, within the large peasant contingent of the Iranian population of the 
time until the August 1953 coup d’état which brought an end to the activities of the party’s 
front organisations, including the body devoted to the peasant question. 
 Besides focusing on the formations through which the Tudeh sought to engage directly with 
rural communities and formulate a platform based on their grievances and requests, this article 
will also compare the Tudeh’s agency within this segment of the Iranian population with its 
efforts across other strata of the Iranian society at the time as well as the party’s reactions to 
peasant-oriented initiatives carried out by both local and national administrations during this 
period. 
 
Keywords: Tudeh Party of Iran, Peasant Mobilisation, Agrarian Relations, Communism in 






As noted by Fakhreddin Azimi, Iran entered the Twentieth century bearing ‘few apparent signs 
of having emerged from the Middle Ages’, with a national population of approximately ten 
million, the majority of whom were of rural or nomadic residence.1 As much as 75 per cent of 
the Iranian population, according to some estimates, continued to reside outside urban centres 
until the mid-1960s, often in a state of severe destitution. During the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, the growing financial indigence of the Qajar court was conducive to state- and crown-
owned arable land being assigned to unscrupulous and profiteering large and often absentee 
landowners, who in turn engaged in exploitative means of control over the peasants who were 
working the land.  
 Since the formation of the initial social-democratic movements at the turn of the 
twentieth century, the modern Iranian Left has retained an active interest in the plight of rural 
dwellers. After producing largely rhetorical support during the decades between the outbreak 
of the Constitutional Revolution in 1906 and the end of Riza Shah’s rule in 1941, the lively 
and pluralistic setting which followed the end of the reign of the first Pahlavi monarch enabled 
the newly created Tudeh Party of Iran to actively seek to mobilise the population of rural areas 
across the country and follow up its attempts at organising industrial workers through the 
creation of a Peasants’ Union. Throughout its active, direct presence on the domestic political 
scene between 1941-53, the Tudeh sought to develop a power-base for itself within the peasant 
strata of society, and included lengthy segments on the most pressing issue of land reform in 
the various programmatic resolutions it produced during conferences and two congresses held 
during those dozen years. From 1951 onwards, a front organisation linked to the party produced 
the country’s first periodical entirely devoted to peasant matters. 
 Nearly a decade after the Tudeh’s expulsion from the political scene as a consequence 
of the August 1953 coup d’état which ousted prime minister Mohammad Musaddiq, the Pahlavi 
state finally implemented the first, systematic nationwide reform of rural land ownership in 
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Iran’s modern history, echoing several of the key proposals previously made by the Tudeh. By 
that time the party’s leadership was based in exile in East Germany, from where it actively 
commented on political developments in Iran and retained a keen interest in rural affairs. 
 The main features of agrarian relations between the 1940s and the 1960s have been the 
focus of a number of academic studies produced during the last few decades. Such works have 
either focused primarily on land tenure issues, delved into the sociology of the Iranian rural 
society of the time, or have assessed the reasons behind the state’s increasingly assertive stance 
on the matter. The Tudeh attitude towards the issue, the patterns through which it sought to 
bring about peasant mobilisation and the aims of such activities are mentioned only in passing 
in the same works.2  The purpose of this article is therefore that of going beyond such accounts 
and providing a more systematic analysis of the Tudeh position and praxis on the peasant 
question between 1941 and 1953, the period in which the party was able to maintain a foothold 
on the Iranian public scene and engage directly with all strata of society, both before and after 
its formal banning in 1949.  
 
The Iranian Left and the Peasant Issue, 1906-1941 
  Iran lacked the structured form of feudalism which had been prevalent in Europe in the pre-
industrial era. In contrast to their European peers, the Iranian peasants, who have been often 
referred to by through the term rai’yat, or serfs well into the twentieth century, were not bonded 
to the land they cultivated and maintained at least nominal freedom of movement. Another 
anomaly of the Iranian case consisted of the peculiarities of private land ownership which 
remained over the centuries, as noted by Cosroe Chaqueri, a privilege, rather than a legally-
enshrined right.3 Large-scale private landownership depended to a large extent on the royal 
court’s propensity to expand its holdings through confiscation and conquest, or reassign the 
same as a reward or as a pacifying gesture to its backers and functionaries. The start of the 
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Qajar dynasty’s rule at the end of the eighteenth century coincided with the increase in the 
amount of land under divani (or crown), or khalisah (state) ownership, both of which accrued 
to the royal court’s possession by way of confiscation and the systematic revocation of the 
fragile claims on ownership present within Islamic canons. The time-honoured vaqf 
endowment system was at times embraced as a ‘defence mechanism’ against the 
‘encroachment of royal authority upon insecure, non-royal property’.4 Another form of land 
ownership, the tuyul, which mainly derived from the practice of providing land as a reward en 
lieu of financial outlays such as a military or civil salary, was formally abolished at the time of 
the constitution-writing process of 1906, but lands assigned through this mechanism remained 
in private hands following the upheaval of that period. 
 The agrarian question remained a vexing one by the start of the twentieth century due to 
the considerable diversity in the national climate, the relative paucity of fertile land in a country 
where over 60 per cent of the surface was desert and the general scarcity of water, which 
resulted in the success of cultivation depending upon either man-made irrigation systems or 
rainwater. The persistent weakness of the central state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century and its inability or unwillingness to engage in a systematic initiative for the 
amelioration of the peasant condition meant that arable terrain across the country was 
effectively divided into a patchwork of fiefdoms where large landowners held sway.  
 By the early 1900s, land ownership in Iran could be broadly divided into five different 
categories. The absentee large and small-scale private landlords formed one group. A small 
segment of land was owned by middle and low-scale peasants who also lived and worked on 
the same. The crown and state lands (divani and khalisah), and vaqf formed three other groups.5 
Several studies which have focused on the extent of ownership of each of these classes prior to 
the major state-driven land reform initiative of the 1960s have converged on only 5-10 per cent 
of arable land being owned by petty landowners, with large landowners owning over half, tribal 
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leaders holding around 15 per cent and state and vaqf lands amounting to around 10 per cent.6 
This breakdown is largely reflected in Ashraf’s breakdown of land ownership related to the 
1925-1960 period, which features a combination of the royal court, 100 large landowner 
families and tribal clans and several hundred other families as owning two thirds of arable land, 
while the vaqf and state lands and 750,000 small landowners each controlling less than a fifth 
of the total.7  
 The bulk of agricultural produce was the result of complex arrangements between 
sharecroppers, peasants and large landowners, who could therefore exploit their commanding 
position to extract surplus labour and other advantageous conditions from those who benefitted 
from nasaq, or cultivation rights. Such exploitation was mainly carried out through the 
mubashir class, a community of on-the-ground representatives of often urban-based landlords.8 
The five-factor principle (land, water, cattle, seeds and peasant labour) was the main factor in 
the calculation of the landlord’s share which, as shall be seen below, became a focal point of 
the post-1941 political scene’s attention given to the agrarian question. 
 By the time the first wave of Iranian social-democratic movements had devised their 
initial programmatic statements and declarations in the period surrounding the Constitutional 
Revolution, the plight and turmoil of the peasant class featured high on the agenda of the radical 
manifestos which aspired to significantly alter the configuration of Iranian society. The formula 
proposed throughout the first decades of the twentieth century primarily consisted of rectifying 
the imbalance in ownership by calling for the transfer of land held by the royal court and large 
landowners. The Mashad programme of the Social Democratic League in September 1907 
called for the confiscation of royal properties and that of largest landlords and the cost-free 
redistribution of the same amongst peasants. It also called for legally stipulated limitations on 
land ownership. Such views had gained traction even amongst elements of the liberal 
bourgeoisie. The Surisrafil periodical stated in several issues that peasants had the right to 
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express opposition to current arrangements, defined the ‘rai’yat ownership’ as the basic 
principle for progress in agriculture in Iran and proposed the creation of a ‘National 
Agricultural Bank’ which would purchase land voluntarily handed over by ‘patriotic princes, 
ministers and Khans’ in depreciating instalments and sell shares in the same to landless 
peasants.9  In similar vein, the resolution of the second congress of the Communist Party of 
Iran of 1921 called for the confiscation of both large and petty absentee landowners’ 
possessions and their assignment to peasants, in order to combat the incomparable ‘destitution 
and injustice’ which had been hitherto practised against Iranian peasants. It also warned that 
peasant mobilisation needed to be flanked by ‘urban revolutionaries’ in order to upend the 
existing feudal order.10  
 The ability of such radical parties to influence state policy was curtailed by a number of 
factors. Riza Shah’s authoritarian suppression of opposition activities and his predatory 
approach to the expansion of his terrains resulted in his rigid modernising agenda not affecting 
large-scale land ownership. 11  The much-vaunted Civil Code reform of 1928 effectively 
strengthened the latter.  Its attempted modernisation of land registration was in assistance to 
the landlords’ ability to control and direct legal proceedings to their own advantage, in effect 
providing bureaucratic consolidation for the practice of large landowning, which had 
previously been subject to the ebbs and flows of the arbitrary style of governance of the Qajar 
monarchs. As noted by Nikki Keddie, the ‘land registration laws were a step to modernisation 
accomplished at the expense of the peasants’.12 Furthermore, a series of laws geared towards 
selling off state land approved during the 1930s ostensibly for the purpose of augmenting the 
petty landowner class yielded the actual effect of increasing the amount of property under 
control of major landlords, particularly the cronies of Riza Shah.13 Their formal influence 
within village communities was further consolidated through a 1935 bill which made the 
kadkhuda appointable by landowners and liable for implementing government directives.14 
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 The material conditions of the peasantry remained a visible element of societal 
backwardness. At the apex of the rule of Riza Shah, the seminal Marxist intellectual Taqi Erani 
delivered the following laconic assessment, which reflected the contemporary state’s inability 
to bring about any form of progress in this regard: 
The 6 million [out of the total national population of 10 million] peasants scattered across 
the Iranian national territory are usually financially poor and illiterate and locked into 
arcane beliefs and superstition. They cultivate land using very basic tools [...] Under the 
spell of these economic and social ailments, the Iranian peasant is generally cowardly, 
beholden to his masters and to primitive beliefs, cunning and deprived of the advantages 
of present-day civilisation.  
 Virtually no book is to be found in villages [...] the local cleric is the only literate 
member of the village community, and the press, including Dunya, do not have any sort 
of presence therein.15 
  
 Both Erani and the various socialist formations of the first decades of the twentieth 
century developed a holistic view of the Iranian peasantry and refrained from providing a more 
introspective analysis of the divergences in the condition of the peasantry across Iranian 
regions. This became apparent as the northern province of Gilan, which hosted the most fertile 
land of the country, became host to a long sequence of febrile initiatives by peasants between 
1906 and 1921. As noted by Pezhmann Sadigh-Dailammi, ‘the fertile land and abundant 
rainfall, the density of the peasant population, the absence of tribes’ and the general prosperity 
of the region enabled the peasantry to function as a standalone class.16 A branch of the social-
democratic movement mobilised the peasantry as early as 1907 in order to refuse to pay taxes 
to landowners. However, the Jangali movement, whose first military operations consisted of 
clashes against private, landowner-organised armed groups, fell short of presenting and 
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implementing a comprehensive land reform programme.  Once in control of urban centres in 
the wake of the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Jangalis proceeded to enforcing confiscation 
against landowners who were politically opposed to them.17  
 
The Tudeh Party of Iran and the Peasant Issue, 1941-1949 
The ban on all ishtiraki, or socialistic organisations enacted by Riza Shah in 1931 prevented 
the Communist Party and other leftist formations from organising an overt peasant wing. Such 
a limitation was largely overcome, however, following the fall from power of the first Pahlavi 
monarch in summer 1941. The Tudeh Party of Iran played a prominent overt role in the Iranian 
domestic political scene throughout the 1940s, and for brief periods succeeded in building a 
parliamentary and cabinet presence, through the three ministers it dispatched to Ahmad 
Qavam’s national unity government in 1946.18 This phase came to an end through an attempt 
on the Shah’s life in February 1949, which was swiftly blamed on the Tudeh and led to the 
formal banning of the party. Concerns over the attitude of the Soviet Union with regards to an 
uprooting of the party and the sequence of weak cabinets which took power in the immediate 
aftermath of this decision enabled the Tudeh to maintain a foothold in Iranian politics through 
the creation of front organisations such as the Jamiyat-i Milli Mubarizah ba Istimar (the 
National Society for Struggle against Colonialism), the Shura-yi Milli-yi Havadaran-i Sulh 
(The National Council of Peace Supporters, the Iranian branch of the global Peace Partisans 
movement) and, as shall be discussed below, the Anjuman-i Kumak bih Dihqanan, or Society 
for Aid to Peasants.  
 The Tudeh’s early concern with the condition of Iranian peasants was a natural 
progression from debates and proposals which had been formulated by its predecessor 
formations. In the weeks following the abdication of Riza Shah, as a debate raged in the winter 
of 1941 over the return of lands confiscated by the monarch to their previous private owners, 
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the Tudeh announced its opposition to the principle that the land was to be passed from ‘usurper 
to usurper’, as the two types of ownerships were essentially identical. The party proposed 
instead to assign the same at no cost to landless peasants.19  
 The early party organs frequently carried commentary which noted how the principles 
which hitherto governed agrarian relations were wholly to the detriment of peasants and petty 
landowners. It pressed for the introduction of mechanisation and for the reform of water rights 
and extraction mechanisms. 20  Its early programmatic resolutions fell short, however, of 
echoing the radical stance of the Social Democrats or the Communist Party. During the first 
Tehran Provincial Conference, which marked in effect the inaugural gathering of the party, the 
prominent Central Committee member Iraj Iskandari, who was the Tudeh leader with the 
closest intellectual affinity to Erani, stated that the present-day condition of peasants was akin 
to that of the serfs of the Middle Ages, if not worse. He then noted the ‘astonishingly luxurious 
lifestyle’ of the absentee landowners, prior to noticing how European countries such as Britain, 
Germany, Romania and Czechoslovakia had to various degrees eliminated this archaic form of 
land ownership by purchasing the land and reassigning it to peasants. He then called for the 
abolition of large landownership through a process akin to the European one in terms of the 
purchase and redistribution of landowner-held terrains. The Iranian peasant had therefore to 
transition from bandah or servant, to malik-i kuchak, or ‘smaller landholder’.21 In order to meet 
such a goal, the following points were included in the revised party programme which emerged 
from the Provincial Conference: 1) Large landowning should be completely eradicated, and 
such lands should be entirely purchased by the state; 2) Arable land should be redistributed and 
sold to peasants by way of long term instalment plans; 3) Khalisah lands should be immediately 
redistributed amongst peasants; 4) Agricultural banks should provide necessary capital for 
peasants to engage in making their agricultural and irrigation practices more efficient.22 
 This blueprint marked the first concrete attempt by a major political party of the post-
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Riza Shah era to introduce a scheme whereby private landowners would be dispossessed 
through compensation and peasants would be charged a fair instalment schedule for the same. 
The principle of the purchase of privately held land and its reselling to peasants at favourable 
rates held sway until the first party congress of August 1944. Besides reiterating all four points 
above, the new programme also called for ‘fundamental reform’ in the ‘unjust’ division of 
produce between landowner and peasant, introducing a system for the election of the kadkhuda, 
the landlord’s representative within villages, and a concerted struggle against the malfeasance 
of government representatives in rural areas and the abolition of all arbitrary forms of taxation 
imposed by landowners.23  The extensive handbook produced by the party theoretician Ahmad 
Qasimi, who belonged to the more radical left-wing flank of the party, as a companion guide 
to the new programme lamented the fact that Iranian peasants were currently making use of 
tools which had remained fundamentally unaltered ‘since the times of Cyrus and Darius the 
Great’. He also bemoaned their lack of ownership and control of water resources, which 
resulted in most peasants making sole use of rainwater for irrigation. The appearance of doctors 
in the midst of peasants was considered by rural inhabitants as being akin to a ‘magical 
phenomenon’. Premature aging was noted as an endemic ailment of peasant society. The 
ongoing practice of bigari, a form of unremunerated labour which effectively featured as a kind 
of non-pecuniary taxation, was compared to forms of slavery. Qasimi did not, however, 
recommend the confiscation of land possessed by major landowners, and confirmed instead 
that the Tudeh accepted the principle of private ownership.24 
 The proposals made during the first congress for the improvement of the condition of 
peasants were implemented in September 1944 through the creation of a Peasants’ Union, 
which consolidated the embryonic peasant associations which had emerged in the Soviet-
occupied provinces of Northern Iran by 1943.25  The creation of the nationwide Union was 
made a necessity by the fact that at the time of the first congress only 2 per cent of party 
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members hailed from the peasantry, while 75 per cent came from the modern working class, a 
statistic which reflected the advanced stage in the activities of the Central Council of Trade 
Unions, the body which organised industrial workers, particularly those active in the oil 
sector.26 The Union became a continuation and expansion of the activities of the fifth party 
committee in Tehran, which was dedicated to coordinating the early peasant-oriented efforts.27 
The Union was coordinated through a central council which was under the purview of the 
Central Committee member Muhammad Bahrami. A group of university students and recent 
graduates, including Yusuf Gharib, Bagher Momeni, Sadiq Ansari and Hussein Nazari, who 
had mostly been active in the fifth committee formed the Organisation’s leadership group.28 
 As noted by Sadiq Ansari, the Peasants’ Union’s activities faced both internal and 
external challenges. The lively urban setting of Iranian politics in the 1940s meant that most of 
the young university graduates and literate political activists who were drawn to the Tudeh 
preferred to discharge their party duties in Tehran or other major cities, and had therefore little 
or no willingness to relocate to the considerably more backwards and uninspiring countryside. 
The widespread illiteracy within peasant communities and their endemic distrust of inquisitive 
urban dwellers descending on their villages furthermore made the spread of party political 
literature and thought a challenging task.29  Nevertheless, the founding charter of the Union 
shows signs of the engagement that the Union was able to initiate with inhabitants of rural 
areas. The preamble contains a highly critical overview of contemporary peasant conditions 
and indirectly offers some context to Erani’s aforementioned despairing remarks. It defines the 
latter as the class which provides the ‘most beneficial contribution to society’ and notes that 
the rai’yat span a spectrum between six and seventy years of age. It then focuses extensively 
on conditions in villages, noting how none of the basic amenities for healthy living, such as 
adequate foodstuffs, hygiene, medicine but also cultural and recreational activities are available 
in rural areas. The rai’yat’s dwellings, the preamble continues, are often hovels situated within 
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caves, and are to be considered inadequate even for animals. Nevertheless, entire peasant 
families lived there with their livestock, in an environment where fleas transmit diseases over 
to humans and the smoke of opium, which is decried as being cheaply provided by the state 
and the arbab in order to weaken the spirit and physique of the rai’yat, mixes with the fumes 
deriving from the preparation of modest food and animal exhalations, thereby generating an 
‘unbreathable’ environment. The inadequate nutritional value of the staple peasant diet resulted 
in shorter life expectancies, the rise of diseases such as malaria and typhus, a child mortality 
rate of 60 per cent and often only healthcare for one peasant every 50,000.30  
 Turning to aspects such as culture, amusement and recreation, the preamble noted how 
the illiteracy rate in ‘civilised’ countries stood at 2-3 per cent, while the figure was set at a 
staggering 99 per cent amongst Iran’s peasant, urban worker and toiler population. The 
ra’iyat’s persistent deprivation from the means to acquire knowledge or pursue an education 
was considered, in ways not entirely dissimilar to the previous considerations by Erani, to be 
part of the arbab’s strategy previously pursued by Riza Shah of concealing and preventing 
better living standards and the spread of consciousness over full civil rights.31 
 After setting out the dire situation of the peasant community in the months immediately 
following the end of the Second World War, the Peasants Union’s founding charter then 
proceeded to include the following elements amongst the key points of its initial aims: the 
purchase of large tracts of privately-owned land by the government, and the sale of those and 
khalisah ones to landless or smallholding peasants by way of an instalment payment system, 
whilst enacting legislation to prevent the re-emergence of large scale landowning; the creation 
of state-owned agricultural banks, with sufficient investment for assistance to peasants; the 
creation of peasant cooperatives to ensure the supply of essential goods at controlled prices, 
and state-owned companies for the exploitation of water resources for irrigation and electricity 
generation; the construction of better peasant housing stock, schools and sanitary units in each 
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village.32 
 In order to meet such objectives, the Unions’ charter noted that a ‘political’ struggle, 
beyond the mainly ‘economical’ one of industrial workers such as those in the oil sector was 
necessary. Forms of mobilisation adopted in the latter setting, such as recurrent strike action, 
were considered impracticable in the rural case. Another key element was the need to ensure 
that peasants would acquire awareness on their general condition, a necessary condition for 
escaping from the arbab’s stranglehold over their livelihood. This would prove to be a 
challenging proposition, due to the considerable variety in the arbab-rai’yat relationships 
across the country. Membership of the Union was open to landless peasants who were working 
on arbabi lands and on rented land. Petty landowners were also accorded membership upon 
condition of also working in their plots, or having ‘common objectives’ and working towards 
the good of deprived peasants.33 
 The Union volunteers who ventured to rural areas were to various degrees faced with the 
distrust and suspicion of peasants. With the exception of northern regions such as Gilan, 
Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, which had been briefly governed by radical, left-wing forces 
between 1919 and 1946, few of the other provinces had witnessed the kind of activities which 
were being promoted and enacted by the Union.34 The latter did, however, have a certain 
success in organising in scattered rural communities the country, at times in eclectic fashion. 
In the autumn of 1946, the peasants of Chardih, a village in Gilan, rallied in the local mosque 
against the mubashir appointed by Ahmad Qavam’s Democratic Party and swore allegiance to 
the Tudeh Party on copies of the Quran.35 Another rally in Gilan in June 1946 called for the 
extension of healthcare and education to rural communities under a banner celebrating Erani.36   
 These localised initiatives did not achieve the broader intended breakthrough. As 
admitted retrospectively by the successor organisation to the Union, the latter’s activities 
gained a measure of success in a limited number of regions, particularly in Gilan, Mazandaran, 
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Isfahan, Malayir and the agricultural areas outside Tehran.  
 The Union never convened a nationwide congress which could bring supportive peasants 
from disparate areas together and instil esprit de corps in them. As sanguinely admitted by a 
prominent party sociologist a decade later, the continued concentration of party activity in the 
urban areas and its banning in early 1949 contributed significantly to stymying any significant 
Union expansion.37 Sadiq Ansari reaches similar conclusions but argues that the party’s lack 
of necessary preparation for a vast scale, uniform mobilisation of the peasantry was also due 
to the extent of state-driven repression against the Tudeh in towns and smaller centres across 
the country during the 1940s, which also resulted in the continued loss of party archival 
documents, particularly the reports of fieldwork conducted by the Union which affected the 
party’s ability to formulate a coherent stance on the peasant question.38  Localised Union 
activities did, however, achieve some measure of success through unusual methods. Riza 
Tahiri, a Union organiser in the Garmsar region, recalled that the organisation took advantage 
of those parts of the Nahj al-Balaqih, the compilation of sayings and declarations attributed to 
the Shia Imam Ali, which were dedicated to social justice and the struggle against zulm, or 
oppression, which was associated with large landowners. Tahiri’s branch also struck an 
efficient alliance with schoolteachers, held in high esteem within the peasant community, who 
assisted with reading out party literature to the largely illiterate peasant cohorts.39 
 The strategy undertaken by the authorities to contrast the rapid growth of the Tudeh 
influence amongst peasants consisted of replicating the Tudeh’s organisational scheme. The 
Democratic Party of Ahmad Qavam, which was set up for the purpose of winning the fifteenth 
Majlis elections in 1945, swiftly built a network of supportive landowners and sought to 
mobilise peasants through rallies which were also attended by the mubashir, the kadkhuda and 
other similar figures who enforced landowner control in the village.40 
 As remarked in the resolution of the second Tudeh party congress, held in May 1948, 
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the activities amongst peasants was decried as hitherto being ‘mostly limited to superficial 
propaganda which was on occasion error-stricken’.  These initiatives were further evaluated 
as lacking a well-defined organisational or proselytising element.41 The decision by the Qavam 
cabinet of 1945 to transfer 15 per cent of the share of the landowner to the peasant-producer 
was singled out, alongside the removal of archaic levies, as the signature elements deriving 
from the party activities in favour of peasants. However, Ansari notes that this slogan and other 
ones provided by the ‘centre’ often took precedence over more necessary local measures, such 
as agitating in favour of the creation of schools or sanatoriums.42 
 The incoming Central Committee was mandated once again to create a broad united 
peasant front, nationwide and local conferences, setting up special classes for training peasant 
cadres and creating a periodical devoted to rural issues.43 The new party programme confirmed 
the previous stance on the free redistribution of khalisah and other state lands and called once 
again for the purchase, rather than confiscation, of landowner-held terrain and its cost-less 
redistribution.44 
 
The Society for Aid to Peasants, 1951-53 
The pledges made during the second congress were entrusted to a new unit devoted to rural 
issues within the roster of the front organisations which were formed following the banning of 
the party in February 1949. Following that date, the Tudeh effectively pursued the Leninist 
principle of combining overt and clandestine activity. The Society for Aid to Peasants 
(henceforth Society) continued to be staffed by white-collar urban young activists who 
maintained an interest in peasant matters. The Society’s thirteen-strong governing council 
included four lawyers and jurists, including Murtaza Nahavandi, its head and Habibullah 
Davari, the editor of the Society’s weekly periodical, Intiqad Barayi Dihqanan-i Iran 
(henceforth Intiqad). Nahavandi had been a contemporary of Grand Ayatullah Burujirdi in the 
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seminary prior to parting ways with clerical life. He would be occasionally dispatched to Qum 
to mediate with Burujirdi at times of rising anti-party sentiment amongst the clergy, and would 
remind him that the wrath of the elite and the royal court against the Tudeh had the effect of 
blunting similar measures against the clergy. Burujirdi would wryly respond through an 
invocation for God to ‘bless party members but prevent their success’. 45  Alongside the 
aforementioned lawyers, Abdullah Yaghmai, a surgeon, Bagher Momeni, who would later 
become one of the twentieth century Iran’s foremost historians, other former Union activists 
such as Gharib and Sadiq Ansari, two veterans of the Jangali movement in Gilan of 1915-20, 
Muhammad Ali Sharifi and Muzaffarzadah and one peasant, Nurullah Khamushi also formed 
its core leadership.46 
 As noted in the new formation’s title, the Society declared in the months following the 
start of its activities that its primary duty was that of achieving improvements in the healthcare 
and cultural knowledge of peasants. In order to reach these objectives, the Society called upon 
healthcare professionals and teachers to provide their services pro bono to peasants.47  The 
Society also provided legal cover and assistance for those peasants involved in local disputes 
with particularly abusive landowners and to highlight the practices of the latter.  The role of 
Nahavandi, Davari and the other legal experts was that of rushing to rural areas at times of 
unrest and providing urgent defence to imprisoned peasant activists.48 Gharib’s memories 
include a particularly turbulent trip to the region outside Isfahan alongside Nahavandi, an 
urbane jurist ill-suited to the less refined aspects of rural reception and hospitality. The 
expedition resulted, however, in the dropping of charges against several peasants and their 
release from the detention imposed by a local sergeant who would later become the secret 
police Savak’s first chief, Taymur Bakhtiar.49 
 The publication of Intiqad, the period’s only journal entirely devoted to peasant matters, 
matched the commitment made at the second party congress and enabled the Society to develop 
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bonds with inhabitants of rural areas. A network of literate supporters would read out the 
contents of every issue to the mass of peasants who were unable to do so.50 Gharib, who 
retained a penchant for satire throughout his life, became the lead writer of a column called 
Amu Haidar (Uncle Haidar), which was occasionally augmented through content from 
Chilingar, the seminal and thought-provoking Tudeh-oriented satirical publication almost 
entirely written in verse. 
 The Society’s broad network of representatives also ensured a steady stream of news 
regarding local developments, which were printed regularly in Intiqad. The ‘News from Iranian 
Villages’ section regularly carried peasant-submitted reports on injustices they faced, such as 
the mubashir of a village in Savchibulaq in the Alborz province refusing to supply water for 
irrigation, or readers from Varamin informing the publication that the landowner General Shafa 
engaged in his latest outrage by instructing notoriously corrupt local gendarmes to douse the 
houses of peasants with petrol.51 It insisted from the start that the widespread lack of land 
ownership by peasants was the root cause of their malaise and deprivation while warning that 
peasants could only improve their situation through a united effort with urban workers, which 
it defined as the only class who would engage in a fruitful alliance with the peasants 
themselves.52   
 In contrast to its predecessor Union, the Society organised frequent local meetings and 
convened a national general assembly on 13 December 1951, marking the first nationwide 
peasant congress in modern Iranian history. During the four-day event, which was held at the 
party’s youth wing headquarters in Tehran, representatives from virtually every agricultural 
region of the country took to the podium. Their views were aptly summed up by the delegate 
from the southern Fars province, who remarked that it was the first time ever that ‘a group of 
jointly-suffering peers’ were congregating from far-flung corners of the country in order to 
exchange views on their joint predicament.53 Similarly to other speakers, he did not point to 
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tangible, long-term results already achieved by the Society, thereby suggesting that the latter 
had not yet overcome the Union’s limitation in securing short-term, local improvements to the 
condition of peasants. Speaking on a broader issue, the representative for Gilan noted that the 
new elections bill proposed by the Musaddiq government ruled out enfranchising illiterates 
once again, which meant that 99 per cent of peasants could be deprived of the right to vote.54  
 The Society also sought to narrow the urban-peasant divide by frequently organising 
events in party facilities in the cities, and organising karavan-i sulh, or ‘Peace Caravans’, which 
would feature young industrial workers and students heading to rural areas for bonding with 
peasants and raising their awareness on the campaigns promoted at the time by the international 
Peace Partisans movement. The Society eventually dispatched a peasant to the Congress of the 
People for Peace of Vienna of December 1952.55  
 
The Tudeh Party and Other Land Reform Initiatives, 1945-51 
Alongside the fervent peasant-oriented activities of the Tudeh seen above, the transformation 
of land ownership became a pressing concern in the post-Constitutional Revolution period. As 
noted above, a string of bills was approved during the 1920s in order to raise the productivity 
of khalisah lands and relieve the state from ownership of parts of them. Such tentative attempts 
at reducing the amount of arable land under state control were, however, decisively undermined 
by Riza Shah’s systematic land predation, which possibly turned him into the Middle East’s 
largest landowner by the end of the 1930s.  
 From the start of the reign of his son and successor Muhammad Riza, the principle of 
the redistribution of the now considerable crown and khalisah lands to peasant ownership 
gained traction within various strands of the political elite. The new monarch showed little 
propensity to maintain ownership over the vast properties bequeathed to him by his father. On 
21 September 1941, Muhammad Riza turned all such properties to the government, which in 
 19 
turn upheld crown ownership over a series of recreational Pahlavi estates in northern Iran.56 
This development enabled many of the landowners who had been previously dispossessed by 
Riza Shah to seek the return of their property. On 2 June 1942, the parliament approved a law 
which enabled these landowners to advance claims on any land which was taken over by the 
first Pahlavi monarch, a move which was seen as an implicit admission of the unjust nature of 
Riza Shah’s initiative.57 During the drafting of the bill, the initial Tudeh newspaper Mardum 
raised the concern that ‘no one appears to be caring about the shameful conditions in which 
nine tenths of the inhabitants of this nation, the peasants’ or to be proposing any process for 
improving their condition.58 The scheme was in particular embraced by Hasan Arsanjani, a 
mercurial journalist and politician who became the main non-Tudeh proponent of radical 
approaches to land reform between the 1940s and 1960s.59 From the first stages of the post-
Riza Shah era, Arsanjani wrote frequently about the need to weaken or remove the grip of large 
landowners over arable land. As opposed to many prominent political figures of the time, 
Arsanjani’s parliamentary career never took off, as his confirmation was rejected through a 
concerted effort by Nasir Zulfaqari, the notoriously despotic landowner of the Zanjan region, 
in early September 1947.  Zulfaqari explained his opposition by noting Arsanjani’s election 
from the Lahijan constituency, the stronghold of his political patron Ahmad Qavam in which 
he had no interests, and his active calls for mending the lacunae of the constitution, which cast 
doubts over his loyalty to the Mashrutah state order. These were effectively ruses designed to 
conceal the efforts by Zulfaqari – who had been prominently singled out as an acute example 
of a feudal landowner during the Pishavari administration – and his peers to eject their main 
opponent from the new fifteenth legislature.60  In 1949, probably influenced by the continuous 
Tudeh agitation within peasant communities, Arsanjani submitted a detailed plan to the prime 
minister of the time, Haj-Ali Razmara, for the sale of khalisah lands to newly formed peasant 
co-operatives.61 Arsanjani sought in this way to exploit signs of an apparent yearning for broad 
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social reform by the Shah. In early 1951, he reacted to a Majlis address on the topic by the 
monarch by attacking through his Dariya periodical the slow pace of land reform, and 
portraying, as he would do in the following decade, the redistribution of wealth as an essential 
step towards ensuring a greater loyalty of the people towards the state. He then called upon the 
Shah to take matters into his own hands by giving away the considerable amount of land he 
had inherited from his father.62 For the next couple of months, Dariya became the beacon of 
radical solutions for land reform, for example proposing a jihad against landowners on grounds 
that the ‘enslavement’ of peasants would continue while the former’s control over land was 
undiminished.63  
 These persuasive calls eventually resulted in the first implementation of redistribution of 
lands under the possession of the Shah at Varamin on 16 March 1951, through which 
approximately a thousand peasants received ownership. This initiative marked the first of a 
series of modest land redistributions of crown lands. The initiative was met with little reaction 
by either the National Front, the umbrella group of supporters of Muhammad Musaddiq, or the 
Tudeh, most likely due to its overlap with the approval of the oil nationalisation bill then under 
way in Parliament. Nevertheless, Varamin remained an important focus for Society activities 
between 1951-53, and featured the candidacy of Yaghmai, who was local to the region, in the 
Seventeenth Majlis elections.64 
 The Varamin redistribution marked the second concerted initiative at land reform in the 
post Riza Shah era. The first was undertaken by the Firqah-i Dimukrat administration during 
the year in which it governed the northern, agriculture-rich Azerbaijan region under Soviet 
protection. A particularly rigid form of landowner domination over peasants had been the norm 
in the region for centuries. 65  On 16 February 1946, the Azerbaijan National Assembly 
approved a bill for the redistribution of 810 villages, or 380,000 hectares of khalisah and 
privately-owned terrains under Firqah control. 66  According to article 1 of this bill, the 
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possessions of large-scale landowners, who were considered to be owning up to 80 per cent of 
arable land in the region, were to be confiscated if they had either fled or were agitating against 
Firqah rule. 67  Article 2 stipulated the creation of a joint commission composed of 
representatives from various ministries, including justice, interior, finance, commerce and 
agriculture. A mechanism for appealing confiscations within a month was also included. 
According to articles 11 and 12, the arbab had to resolve their differences with the peasants. 
A new agricultural bank was also set up to provide financial assistance for mechanisation and 
other improvements to agricultural techniques.68  
 The approval of the land bill underpinned the convening of the first peasant congress of 
twentieth-century Iran.  The gathering took place at the Firdawsi hall in Tabriz on 14 April 
1946, with the presence of over 600 delegates. Three days prior to this seminal event, the Firqah 
administration released an addendum to the February law which stipulated that the yearly 
produce was to be divided at 50 per cent between remaining landowners and peasants, who 
would therefore get a share far higher than the peers in the rest of the country.69 Addresses to 
the congress reiterated how agriculture was at the heart of the administration’s economy. The 
aforementioned land confiscation bill was expanded upon, alongside an indictment of the 
previous rulers’ arbitrary redistribution practices. The orator cited in particular the case of a 
Qajar-era masseur who was granted a gift in land from the Shah as appreciation for his kisah 
massages.70 The Pahlavi era practices were lambasted for having engaged in the sale of state 
land at very cheap prices to select aristocrats.71 
 Referring to the current land distribution efforts, the congress noted that the Agriculture 
Ministry first sought to dispatch its own bureaucrat to oversee the redistribution processes, but 
the lack of time and resources compelled them instead to send a representative for each village, 
who would collaborate with a rish safid, or respected elderly chosen by the villagers 
themselves, who would in turn bring about a five-member commission which would proceed 
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to implementing the redistribution. The congress also pledged to build sanatoriums and 
schools.  
 Despite not being an active part of this land reform initiative, the Tudeh would later often 
extol the Azerbaijan process as a seminal moment in peasant emancipation following the 
collapse of the Firqah administration in 1946.72  
 
The Tudeh Party and Musaddiq’s Agricultural Bills of 1952-53 
The Musaddiq government which was formed in the weeks following the Varamin 
redistribution did not devolve significant attention to the peasant issue prior to the 30 Tir (July 
1952) incident. Following his return to power on the cusp of the brief popular uprising, 
Musaddiq proceeded to announce a nine-point reform plan, which was to be implemented 
through the special powers he requested and obtained to rule without legislative approval for a 
period of six months. The first major initiative which was announced during this phase was the 
‘Bill for the Augmentation of the Farmers’ Share and the Agricultural Construction 
Organisation’, which was introduced on 13 August 1952.  A separate, briefer bill introduced 
simultaneously forbade landowners from receiving livestock, foodstuffs and unremunerated 
labour as taxation from peasants.  
 According to the Augmentation Bill, the 15 per cent reduction in the share of the produce 
assigned to landowners, previously decided by the Qavam administration, was now raised to 
20 per cent, half of which was to be paid over directly to the peasant, and the other half to be 
allocated to improvements in village infrastructure, particularly the provision of clean water, 
and public buildings such as mosques, communal baths, and storage. This bill also stipulated 
the creation of cheap housing, schools and medical centres, increasing rural sanitation 
awareness and education, and preventing plant and livestock epidemics. All inhabitants of a 
village, including landowning peasants and those not working on the land, or khushnishin, were 
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mandated to devolve 3 per cent of their earnings to a cooperative fund which would be used 
for the aforementioned infrastructural purposes and which was also to be funded through low-
interest loans provided by the Agricultural Bank. 
 In order to coordinate these various activities, the bill stipulated the creation of a three-
layered council structure.  The lowest level of the latter was formed by a Village Council 
composed of five members, as follows: a representative of the landowner, the local kadkhuda, 
and three respected locals chosen by the peasants. All Council members had to be at least 20 
years of age, have a clean judicial slate and meet a literacy requirement, which restricted the 
ability of peasants to choose an illiterate member for more than the time it took to seek a literate 
replacement. The next step up featured two entities which received 50 per cent of the 
infrastructural budget: the dihistan, or council formed of a set of villages which decided on 
major funding or infrastructural projects through the participation of the local governor and 
representatives from Village Councils and landowners, and finally the regional, or bakhsh 
council which incorporated the previous bodies across a greater surface area.73  
 
 The August 1952 bills marked an earnest attempt in seeking to improve the condition of 
peasants and rural infrastructure while sidestepping the vexing issue of land ownership. Rather 
than focusing on the primary concern of the Tudeh, the government sought to instil duties 
within the existing landowner-peasant relationship in order to bring about quality of life 
improvements and an increase in productivity based on the increase in peasant profit and 
welfare. Such a focus was probably due to the continued heightened presence of landowners 
in state institutions, most particularly the Majlis.74 According to statistics compiled by Shajii, 
59 per cent of the members of the seventeenth legislature belonged to the malik class, despite 
the annulment of the elections themselves in around half, mostly rural constituencies, due to 
likely tampering by landlords.75 
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 The publication of the bills was conducive to a spirited debate within the political scene. 
The main pro-government daily championed their contents by noting how the same were 
‘without precedent’ in Iranian history, due to the hitherto primordial conditions of the peasantry 
and remarked how both foreign and domestic observers still chose to compare the same to 
medieval serfs. It then noted how the continuation of the current situation would effectively 
mark a form of ‘collective public suicide’ for a nation which was sharing 2000 km of border 
with a ‘major communist country’ such as the Soviet Union. The persistence of the kind of 
unfair conduct brought about hitherto by the large landowners, the editorial continued, had the 
potential of generating the most robust case for the expansion of communism in Iran.76 The 
same analysis admitted, however, that the bills introduced by Musaddiq could only be 
considered as a first step towards a more complete reform, which had to include the principle 
of tahdid, or legal limitation of large land ownership, and called for the purchase of arable 
terrain from the arbab and its sale to peasants by instalment. The editorial concluded that both 
the practice of agriculture and the condition of the peasantry would be severely inhibited until 
the landless peasants will become owners.77 The Zahmatkishan Party, which was at that time 
strongly supportive of the government and strenuously opposed to the Tudeh, also had a mixed 
reaction to the bills and stated that Musaddiq ‘could have, and should have taken more 
profound steps for the reform of agriculture’. It also noted the vagueness of the shorter bill, 
which ostensibly had the aim of banning arbitrary landlord-imposed levies, actually paved the 
way for additional taxation due to its vague and unclear structure.78 As remarked within a 
British Embassy report prepared shortly after the publication of the bills, the Zahmatkishan’s 
lukewarm reaction was probably due to its leader Muzaffar Baqai’s failed effort to push 
through a parliamentary bill of his own to increase the peasants’ share by 15 per cent, which 
was higher than the 10 per cent share accruing to the peasants through Musaddiq’s bill.79 
 Establishment sources voiced moderate support for Musaddiq’s initiative. An editorial 
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in the Kayhan daily confirmed, for example, the view that the majority of Iran’s population 
was of peasant stock, but the present condition of the latter was a major collective cause of 
concern. It noted, however, that the contents of the two bills ‘help in improving the conditions 
of agriculture, but do not constitute a permanent cure for the ailments’ noted previously. It 
pinpointed the root cause of such a situation as being the persistence of the arbab-ra’iyat 
relationship, and passionately argued that ‘the real landowner is the person who works the land 
in the cold and the heat’.80  
 The content and line carried forward in these editorials highlights the fact that even some 
elements of the political class of the time had endorsed a position which bore considerable 
similarity, if not full overlap, with the proposals put forward by the Tudeh during the 1940s, 
particularly the resolution of the first congress and the founding charter of the Peasants’ Union. 
By the time Musaddiq’s bills were published, however, the Tudeh had moved beyond its 
previous appeasement on the right to compensation of large landowners and had converged 
instead on a radical version of the Second Congress resolution. In the days following the 
publication of the bills, the various party organs collectively called once again for the 
expropriation of large landowners and the redistribution of their land for free to peasants. The 
Society noted in particular that Musaddiq, whom it termed a ‘large landowner’ by virtue of his 
possession of several villages in the Savchilagh area, had decided to tend to his own interests 
by promoting bills which ‘do not meet any of the fundamental demands of the peasants, ie. 
water and land possession, but on the other hand had reduced even the previous 15 per cent [of 
the share of the landlord which had been reassigned by the Ahmad Qavam administration in 
August 1946]’. The same analysis also charged the prime minister with reviving several levies 
which had been discontinued in all but a few select villages.81  It also urged peasants to exploit 
an apparent ambiguity in the bill on whether the stipulated 20 per cent was in addition to the 
15 per cent re-assigned by Qavam by pressing large landowners to honour both payments. 
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Landless peasants were furthermore urged to persuade petty landowners of the proposition that 
paying the 15 per cent share was to their advantage and created unity against the common 
‘feudal’ enemy.82 Despite an initial overtly negative reaction, the Society urged its members 
and supporters to take part in village council elections, with a view to ensuring that landowner 
representatives would have a minor role in the same. The Central Committee’s own reflections 
on the bills noted that the same had the intention of forming a ‘kulak’ class within Iranian rural 
communities and stated that no reform taking place under the aegis of the current ‘feudal’ 
arrangement of land ownership would be beneficial to peasants. It then highlighted the bills’ 
shortcomings in this regard to press for the unity between landless peasants, those less destitute 
and petty landowners against the feudal and large landowners.83 
 A few months later, in early June 1953, the Musaddiq government passed another bill 
which placed crown lands previously seized by Riza Shah and now relinquished by his son 
Muhammad Riza to government control. It stipulated that a new Khalisah Institution was 
entrusted with administering the land and diverting profits to the charitable Shahinshah 
Foundation and in preparation for other socially worthy initiatives, such as a new Agricultural 
Faculty.84  The Society criticised the government decision by noting the prime minister’s 
reluctance to grant ownership to peasants, as article 4 of the bill called for the ‘sale and 
assignment of khalisah land according to laws and regulations previously approved by Majlis’, 
which the Society considered to be an effective return to the Riza Shah-era facilitation of the 
expansion of large landowners’ possessions, as the latter were the only actors who could benefit 
from such provisions85   
 Musaddiq’s bills had therefore the effect of drawing the Tudeh and the National Front-
led government further apart on the peasant issue. An internal critical retrospective assessment 
of the relationship between the Tudeh and the National Front noted several years later that even 
though the dispossession of arbab properties and the free redistribution of the same to landless 
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peasants was an essential condition for the resolution of the land issue, the Musaddiq bills were 
a ‘step forward’ with regards to the status quo and in order to acquire added welfare for 
peasants. The same were not to be considered ‘reactionary’, as implied by the contemporary 
Tudeh analysis, but were rather progressive due to the conditions of the peasant communities, 
which had not yet reached the required level of awareness for large-scale struggle and 
mobilisation, and concluded by criticising the Tudeh’s uncompromising opposition to 
Musaddiq’s proposals.86 
 
The Kurdish Exception 
Despite its robust criticism of the Musaddiq bills, the Tudeh did not lend its support to the 
peasant rebellion in the Kurdish region of Mukriyan which emerged in the weeks following 
their publication. As noted by Vali, the rebellion’s origins rested in the particularly harsh 
conditions hitherto imposed on Kurdish sharecroppers, and were fomented by the peasants’ 
conviction that the Musaddiq administration had finally resorted to enacting legislation which 
would assist their quest to limit the landowners’ ability to enact arbitrary forms of taxation and 
levies.87 Initial support for the bill morphed, however, into demands originally made by a 
Bukan tailor called Haj Ghasim, for landowners to surrender the full documentation related to 
land sales which had been completed financially but not legally. The ensuing widespread 
rebellion was eventually put down through joint efforts by the landowners and the army.88 
Despite the similarity between the demands of at least part of the Kurdish peasantry and the 
various Tudeh critiques of the Musaddiq bills, there was little sign of concern or support for 
the Mukriyan rebellion within party organs at the time. This can be at least partly explained by 
the Society’s lack of presence in Kurdish rural areas, which is made apparent by the lack of a 
representative from that region in the aforementioned annual assembly and by the sparse news 
from Kurdistan published in Intiqad’s otherwise exhaustive reports on peasant mobilisation in 
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other regions. The Tudeh’s inability or unwillingness to engage substantially with the Kurdish 
issue may also have been due to special circumstances which were governing that region’s 
agrarian relations. In contrast to the Azeri case, the Mahabad Republic administration was 
unable to propose or implement any substantial land reform plan. As explained by Qasimlu, 
prior to the establishment of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), 78 per cent of the region’s 
arable land was controlled by large, mostly tribal landowners or Aghas, with peasants being in 
control of 8 per cent.89 The fifth article of the founding statement of the KDP contained the 
pledge to find an understanding between the arbab and the ra’iyat and assure the prospects of 
both through a ‘general law’.90 Such development did not, however, take place during the 
Mahabad Republic era. As noted by Hawar Nerwiy, the Aghas strong hold on the livelihoods 
of peasants prompted Qazi Muhammad, the leader of the KDP, to avoid confrontation with the 
Aghas and therefore refrain from engaging in an initiative comparable to the one undertaken 
by Jafar Pishihvari in Tabriz.91 The KDP’s reaction to the Musaddiq bills contained an analysis 
of the pattern through which the state would purchase all the tobacco and beet crop from the 
Kurdish peasants. The government was pressed to raise the price of the purchased crops amid 
the KDP echoing the Tudeh’s depiction of the establishment as a whole being beholden to the 
landowners.92 
 The Tudeh Party’s apparent lack of interest in the Kurdish issue was also probably due 
to its minimal presence in the region. As recalled by Ghani Bulurian and Qasimlu, the Tudeh 
dispatched half a dozen lower ranking members to Kurdistan in 1951 at the request of the KDP 
in order to provide a political education for the latter’s fledgling cadres.93 At the time of the 
Mukriyan rebellion, the Tudeh had a skeleton presence in the area, one which was mostly 
devoted to ideological training and was bereft of the ability to significantly affect the Mukriyan 




Conclusion – An Impassioned but Inconclusive Attempt at Peasant Mobilisation 
Between its foundation in 1941 and the coup against Musaddiq in 1953, the Tudeh Party of 
Iran devoted significant attention to the plight and conditions of the Iranian peasantry. The 
topic featured extensively in the deliberations of the main party conferences and two bodies 
were created with the specific aim of mobilising the peasantry and seeking to bring about a 
lasting bond between the latter and urban workers. The circumstances of the time also enabled 
the party to make deeper inroads than its predecessor organisations in the Iranian Left, whose 
ability to go beyond proclamations and resolutions in favour of the peasantry was stymied by 
their lack of presence within rural communities.  
 From the outset, the Tudeh identified the vagaries and shortcomings of the Iranian land 
ownership structure as the main element upon which the campaign for the improvement in the 
conditions of the peasantry should be structured. It had, however, to contend with a challenging 
environment, which included a very low initial party membership deriving from the peasant 
component of society, the persistence of landowner abuses of power, and ultimately a party 
leadership and organisation which failed to attribute the same resources devoted to urban and 
industrial worker mobilisation towards the peasant question, thereby confirming the 
prevalently urban nature of the Tudeh itself. 
 The August 1953 coup against Musaddiq resulted in the suppression of all Tudeh-
affiliated organisations and prevented any breakthrough in the Society’s activities and halted 
the possibility of extra-governmental initiatives for land reform. As noted sanguinely at the end 
of the 1950s in the internal party analysis, the role and participation of the peasantry and tribal 
folk in the oil nationalisation movement and national political developments between 1951-53 
remained limited, thereby constituting a major weakness of the nationalisation movement due 
to the ‘near totality’ of the army rank and file being of peasant or tribal extraction.94 These 
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factors also reduced the possibility of peasant uprisings forestalling the machinations against 
the Musaddiq government or reverting its overthrowal. 
 Despite the Tudeh’s lack of success in achieving the broader political mobilisation of the 
peasantry, a circumstance it shared with virtually all its peers, the party’s sustained activities 
in the rural realm between 1941 and 1953 yielded several important results. The Society for 
Aid to Peasants succeeded in building a network of sympathetic rural supporters, which in turn 
enabled the Society’s journal, Intiqad to maintain a valuable ongoing voice and record of 
peasant demands.  From 1941 onwards, the party and its associated organs insistently shifted 
the attention on the systemic iniquity of land ownership patterns which held sway in Iran as 
late as the middle of the twentieth century, which in turn resulted in a remarkably high degree 
of similarity in the reaction of the Tudeh and its main pro-government foes to the Musaddiq 
bills of August 1952. The Tudeh’s lack of a foothold within the state sphere and its 
continuously inimical relationship with the rest of the scene, including the National Front and 
Musaddiq, prevented further collaboration between the Society and progressive elements of 
the executive and legislative branches who shared sympathy on the destitute nature of the 
Iranian peasantry and led the Party as a whole to adopt a resolutely negative attitude to the 
prime minister’s agrarian-related bills of summer 1952, which marked an earnest attempt to 
redress the imbalance in landowner rights and privileges without pivoting on the thorny 
question of land ownership.  
 Following the coup of August 1953, the Tudeh lost the ability to maintain a cogent and 
direct presence in rural areas and resorted to becoming an interested bystander as the state 
progressively came around to the idea of engaging in sustained land reform. Several of Tudeh 
veterans, such as Gharib, ended up however serving in the Agriculture Ministry from the end 
of the 1950s, and were a likely influence in the formulation of the land reform plan included in 
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